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Abstract 
Spatial representations, metaphors and imaginaries (cyberspace, web pages) have been 
the mainstay of internet research for a long time. Instead of repeating these themes, 
this paper seeks to answer the question of how we might understand the concept of 
time in relation to internet research. After a brief excursus 
on the general history of the concept, this paper proposes three different approaches to 
the conceptualisation of internet time. The common thread underlying all the 
approaches is the notion of time as an assemblage of elements such as technical 
artefacts, social relations and metaphors. By drawing out time in this way, the paper 
addresses the challenge of thinking of internet time 
as coexistence, a clash of fluxes, metaphors, lived experiences and assemblages. In 
other words, this paper proposes a way to articulate internet time as a multiplicity. 
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The garden of forking paths is … an infinite series of times, a growing, dizzying 
net of divergent, convergent and parallel times. (It is) a network of times which 
approach one another, fork, break off, or are unaware of one another. (Borges, 
1970: 53) 
 
Spatial representations, metaphors and imaginaries (cyberspace, web pages, 
virtual arena) have been the mainstay of internet research for a long time. 
This tendency has left internet research with a multitude of spatial concepts 
but very few concepts of internet time (Markham, 2003). Nevertheless, 
this remains a question crucial to the development of a deeper and 
more articulated understanding of the internet. This article considers the 
development of time as a general concept through history and proposes 
three possible approaches to the question of how we might understand and 
employ this concept in relation to internet research. Each of these approaches 
is enframed by different understandings of how technology and society relate 
to each other. While some of them dwell on the nature of the question of 
internet time, others explore probable solutions and negotiations. In other 
words, the deliberate diversity of the approaches outlined here is a calculated 
bid to refresh and reinvigorate discussion on this important question. 
The first section briefly explores the history of the concept of time within 
the broad context of the Western philosophical tradition. It explores, in 
particular, three critical understandings of time: that of classical philosophy, 
the Kantian and the contemporary. The latter, as a developing and hence 
unstable paradigm, is constructed through a composite view of contemporary 
science and philosophy after the emergence of chaos theory. It suggests that 
the Deleuzian reconstruction of the historical significance of time might be 
one means to define the concept of time within a network of concepts and 
facilitate its inclusion in discussions of internet research on time. 
The second section discusses the use of metaphors as tools of 
communication to develop consensual understandings in virtual 
environments. In particular, it highlights the effects that the metaphors 
brought online by participants have on future possibilities of the internet. In 
doing so, it draws attention to how the internet, as an intangible constructed 
social space, can be shaped by the different metaphors of time adopted by 
users (and researchers), which both enable and constrain certain decision 
pathways and outcomes. 
The third section takes a wider approach, informed by the view that 
research on the social implications of the internet cannot be confined merely 
to its users because,  as it contends, the internet’s effects extend far beyond the 
immediate boundaries of those who use it. Therefore, this section advances 
an understanding of time in relation to the internet which is based on the 
notion of the lived, as articulated by Henri Lefebvre in his consideration of 
space. It suggests that such an application of the notion of lived time would 
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better accommodate within its framework both users and non-users of the 
internet. 
Finally, the last section suggests that the bifurcation of time into lived and 
instrumental temporalities occludes the multiplicity of timings involved in the 
internet assemblage, and prevents researchers from tracing the full depth of 
technical mediations. Instead, the section suggests that approaching network 
temporalities in their richness and depth requires tracing the modalities of 
technical objects. This approach has no use for the bifurcation between clock 
time and the time of humans, and instead concerns itself with measuring the 
intensity of timings. Timing, in turn, is always an inscription to a place, never 
a substitution from it; it is an additional layer we add to an always already 
lived reality of which techniques and machines are an integral part. 
This article addresses the challenge of thinking internet time as a multiplicity 
of fluxes, metaphors, lived experiences and assemblages. The possibility of that 
multiplicity is explored in the following section, which aims to re-trace the 
main passages of the historical construction of the concept of time and to 
sketch a contemporary understanding of it, through the thought 
of Gilles Deleuze (1994, 2004). In this sense, this section acts as a background 
of the proposed approaches because it exposes their common roots and the 
general contemporary philosophical frameworks in which they reside. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME 
In pre-Socratic philosophy concepts are often embodied by divinities. Time 
as we commonly understand it is incarnate in Chronos or Aion, a god 
emerging from primordial Chaos to superintend the Ages. Although a very 
powerful divinity, Chronos represents  mainly the quantitative nature of time. 
Accordingly, he is subordinate to history, 1 that is, to the events that occur 
within time itself. Qualitative moments or ‘special occurrences of time’ are 
instead represented by a different god, Kairos. 
In his interpretation of pre-Socratic philosophy, Plato understands 
time essentially  as Chronos, and in particular either as ‘the number’ which 
measures the divine order, or as ‘the calendar’ which describes this order 
in a cyclic way. It is after Plato that Aristotle introduces a conceptual shift 
from numbering and the measurement of the cyclic movement of the stars, 
to the very movement of the stars (astrology and astronomy). Within both 
the Platonic and Aristotelian frameworks, time is ‘order’ rather than chaos 
(Deleuze, 2004). 
Compared to classical philosophy, the philosophy of Kant represents 
a revolutionary approach to time. Within the Kantian framework of 
understanding, reality is a sequence of phenomena deployed in time. Reality 
is thus mirrored by the sequence of time’s units. Accordingly, Kantian 






re-conception of time are three major shifts. Firstly, from representing the 
order par excellence, time becomes with Kant ‘something’ that is ordered. 
Secondly, from referring to a cyclic, circular movement, time becomes a 
linear movement, where the beginning is god, or empty time, and the end is 
eternity, or the absence of time. Thirdly, rather than being subordinated to 
events happening in time, i.e. its quality, time is now what everything and 
everyone else is subordinate to (Kant, 1997[1788], 1998[1787]). 
It is no coincidence that the Kantian linear conception of time is, 
essentially, the one first adopted by Newton and Newtonian science. Indeed, 
Kant is said to have been saturated with Newtonian physics (Whitehead, 
1953). Both see time as linear, which has had important consequences for 
science and ‘laboratory practice’. Since Newton, in fact, scientific experiments 
have been characterised by the comparison of the past with the future, 
performed in the present. In other words, laboratory time is conceived as a 
sequence of predictable ordered moments, a series that can be traced 
and retraced in both directions with the trickery of mathematics (Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979). 
Within this practice, conditions that cannot be observed in situ are 
‘recreated’ in the laboratory. That is, past or future conditions are explored 
by moving the present experiment along the axis of a linear time. The latter 
operation, known as the calculation of the timeline of a dynamic system, is a 
mathematical calculation of classic dynamics that locks time into an infinite 
series of static frames, similar to movie-frames. One major constraint of such 
an operation is the absolute precision on which such calculations are based, 
a precision that requires the perfect control of every element of any such 
experiment (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). 
However, the Newtonian conception of time has become untenable 
because a full investigation of unstable systems has evidenced the impossibility 
of total control. Thermodynamic systems, for example, have always resisted 
complete control and have been responsible for some of the major dilemmas 
of disorder. This is because thermodynamic systems sometimes undergo 
unpredictable and irreversible change in time, while losing more and more 
energy as they go. Dissipation and continuous change of status make precision 
almost impossible and undermine laboratory practice. In particular, they call 
for a re-conceiving of dynamics and its laws, that is, time and its management 
in science. Hence, through the study of thermodynamic systems, and 
more generally that of all systems tending towards entropy and disorder, the 
concept of time is being reshaped once again, to account for unstable 
conditions. This is why, metaphorically speaking, the concept of chaos has 
recently emerged with renewed significance from the irremediably fractured 
linear time of Kant. 
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Nevertheless, the fracture of linear Kantian time actually pre-dates 
thermodynamics and occurs much earlier within philosophical discourse. The 
definition of the concept of time, as well as of chaos, is one of the major issues 
at stake in the so called ‘science war’ waged throughout the entire twentieth 
century. Probably the most critical point of this ‘war’ occurred when Henri 
Bergson failed to defend the cause of coexistence of the multiplicity of 
lived times (where true duration is understood as a qualitative multiplicity or 
time that is flowing (Bergson, 1910: 110) within real time. As Einstein put it, 
the intuitive coexistence of different durations in the same world was 
rejected by science and the very idea of a multiplicity of times was labelled as 
incompetence (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). 
Although Einstein and Poincare, in different ways and with different 
agendas, had shaken the foundations of Newtonian mechanics with the 
theory of relativity, the concept of time within it advances only by the 
first of the many steps Bergson anticipated (Galison, 2003). The theory of 
relativity, in fact, transforms the Newtonian conception of a single uniform 
and unidirectional time in a relativist conception of multiple times relative to 
multiple moving observers. In other words, it works through a more efficient, 
synchronised conception of time as a clock time, efficiently supporting the 
nascent globalisation of market and labour belonging to modernity. The early 
work of Poincare, instead, centered on the principles of chaos theory rather 
than the modernist vision of clock time, later allowed a wider understanding 
of thermodynamics and complexity. 
However, the confrontation between natural sciences and human sciences is 
still the locus where the re-conception of time remains trapped and strives to 
emerge; only recently have some convergent analyses been developed, which 
offer opportunity for discussion and reflection. Most of them spring from 
the redefinition of previously closed concepts such as chaos, duration, speed 
and synchronicity. In the realm of science, for example, the concept of chaos 
and the focus on complex systems head a move towards the rearrangement 
of the role of time in scientific research practice (Nikolis & Prigogine, 1989). 
Analogously, philosophy, and in particular French philosophy, has recuperated 
the intuition of Bergson on duration to create an intellectual framework 
capable of accommodating a different idea of time (Guattari, 1995). 
Within a convergent perspective of science and philosophy, Deleuze 
(1994) posits a re-conception of time as constructed through the historical 
development of the concept itself. According to him, it was the conception 
of cyclic time that led to the establishment of habits. That is, of passive 
syntheses of moments, as they are understood within a cyclical repetition 
(day/night, seasons, birth/death). These same habits make sense of time as 
a continually living present. Linear time, in contrast, makes sense of time 






repeat themselves so that they never become habits. These same memories 
therefore regard time as a past that has never been present. Deleuze associates 
both habits and memories with the characteristics belonging to the old Greek 
god, Chronos. 
In their stead, Deleuze proposes a time conceived as a future. In other 
words, instead of the repetition of the identical, typical of cyclic time, or the 
absence of repetition proper of linear time, he suggests that contemporary 
understandings of time embrace the repetition of the differences. This 
repetition is intended as the representation of moments that are never 
identical to the ones to be represented, precisely because once re-acted or 
re-enacted they become different from the original. The repetition of 
differences makes sense of time as a future, as a becoming. Deleuze envisages 
this form of time as the re-emergence of the qualities of the lesser known 
Greek divinity Kairos (the instant, the event). Such a re-conceptualisation 
would be most powerful as it has the advantage of repeating the past as a form 
of present but in a different time and in an undetermined way, outside the 
sequence of linear time. In this sense, it resembles the characteristics of 
chaos as it stands for the unpredictable unfolding of the present, an unfolding 
which, signified by the internet, stands for a cohabitation of difference. 
 
METAPHORS OF INTERNET TIME AND FUTURE STUDIES 
Time, imagined as a multiplicity of differences, is difficult to grasp. Metaphors 
are one of the main strategies that can be employed to grasp such abstract 
notions. Spatial and social relations that occur on the internet are also 
defined, at least in part, by the consensual metaphors used by the participants. 
Metaphors are of interest not only in terms of how they work to define and 
redefine virtual spaces and interactions, but also for what they reveal about 
how the participants’ mental models or paradigms promote or deny certain 
choices. Metaphors offer a way of understanding the processes that lead to 
choices that participants make within the context of their online interactions, 
and that affect their future possibilities. It is this use of metaphor, as a way 
of opening up and exploring potential futures issues, which is of particular 
interest in this discussion. 
Metaphors refer not only to the descriptors and language used (e.g. 
‘time flies’), but also betray how users think about and engage with the 
system (Cornish, 2004). Elements that fit the metaphoric system are seen as 
‘obvious’; elements that do not can be marginalised within the discussion. For 
example, the early metaphor of internet as a ‘superhighway’ privileged linear 
spatial models of the virtual over more complex three-dimensional concepts 
of space and place online. Similarly, but on a somewhat grander scale, the 
Kantian and scientific conceptions of time discussed earlier continue to shape 
expectations and paradigms of time, and are privileged  as rational, logical 
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and ‘matter of fact’ in some cultures. Futures studies challenges such acts 
of privileging by seeking to deconstruct the assumptions and limitations of 
existing metaphors, and by considering how alternative metaphors may alter 
perceptions of what may be possible (Inayatullah, 2005). 
Within a singular cultural context, metaphors of time can appear ubiquitous 
– for example, some cultures often describe time as a river, a unidirectional 
flow from a past to a future. But there is no singular ubiquitous 
‘internet culture’ as such. Rather, users from different backgrounds converge 
and interact to various extents with users from other contexts. These different 
users bring with them different metaphors and understandings of time. 
Inayatullah (2005) notes that some of these include metaphors of degeneration 
and stagnation, metaphors of time as timelessness with no beginning or 
end, cosmological time, or time as a lifecycle where each ending is another 
beginning. Each of these metaphors brings with it assumptions and framings of 
the link between past, present and future. For example, time as degeneration 
would seem to suggest a sense of inevitable decline, whereas time as a lifecycle 
brings with it a framework of constant renewal. These different metaphoric 
framings therefore shape how users engage with ideas of the future, and how 
they pursue desirable futures or let the future ‘wash over them.’ 
Leaving aside for one moment the highly problematic issue of how to 
approach and develop understandings of the multiple metaphors of time 
online, this discussion will first turn to look briefly at how these different 
metaphors interact or suggest different futures potentials. 
Futures studies is interested in metaphors for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
metaphors betray the paradigms and mental models their users possess (Dator, 
1997; Rycroft, 2006; Wyatt, 2004). This suggests what may be considered 
plausible (and preferable) to these users as they consider their options and 
make choices which affect the future of the system. Macrohistory approaches 
to futures questions continue this idea, and analyse metaphors in order to 
challenge dominant paradigms of time, space and culture (Inayatullah, 1998, 
2005). Indeed, understanding and working with metaphors constitutes a key 
element to more recent third wave futures research. These newer research 
approaches seek to not just passively forecast futures possibilities, but to 
actively draw attention to such constraining paradigms and to suggest other 
options and other ways of understanding or negotiating the constraints these 
paradigms impose on users (Inayatullah, 2005; Slaughter, 2004). 
This brings us back to the metaphors of time online. Whilst there is not 
sufficient room to develop an analysis of all metaphors of time that can 
be found on the internet, it is still illustrative to look at some examples 
to demonstrate how futures studies may work with such metaphoric 
understandings to explore future possibilities for a transnational system 






Firstly, it needs to be emphasised that metaphors are representative of 
underlying cultural, social and political values (Ihsan, Inayatullah & Obijiofor, 
1995). They do not occur in a vacuum, and as such there is an investment in 
the underlying assumptions that support such metaphors. For example, Asian 
metaphors of time include the metaphor of the tree, with roots in the past 
and many branching options into the future (Inayatullah, 2005). This 
metaphor, different from Western ideas of time as river, also reflects values 
such as respect for the past and cultural predecessors. On a system such as 
the internet, which is hyped as a flat, egalitarian hierarchy (though that itself 
is challengeable), it cannot be assumed that one metaphor, and its related 
sets of values and priorities, should automatically become dominant. One 
consequence of making explicit the underlying values of metaphors is the 
revelation and indeed, awareness of, the political aspects to understandings 
of internet and time. 
This is not to say that metaphors are empty or meaningless in themselves. 
Metaphors are replicated and reinforced through language and the processes 
of communication, and it is within this act of communication that meaning 
is constructed and, more importantly for futures studies, reconstructed (Ihsan 
et al., 1995). Stevenson (1998) goes as far as to argue that this communication 
across cultures may lead to new negotiations regarding metaphors and the 
assumptions that support them, with subsequent alterations in terms of 
the perceived range of choices available. In other words, by comparing 
personal or cultural metaphors in a multicultural space such as is potentially 
possible online, the political values will become clearer, and will lead to a 
renegotiation of metaphors and their underlying values. It is still to be seen 
whether such renegotiation of metaphors will occur in any widespread 
fashion online, or whether separate metaphoric frameworks will exist 
alongside one another in cybernetic cultural enclaves, such as can be seen 
already with the different language groups online. 
Competing metaphors of time can also have a strong effect on how 
actively participants pursue different futures outcomes (Ambos-Spies, Home 
& Schöning, 1993; Waldrop, 1992). For example, compare two metaphors 
already cited: time as a river and time as a tree. Time as a river carries 
with it connotations of passivity: time flows on, time passes. Time, in this 
metaphoric framework, will move from a source, a singular beginning to an 
unspecified singular end, no matter what. Conversely, the metaphor of time 
as a tree is fixed, literally rooted and grounded in a past, with a panoply of 
possibilities ‘branching out’ above. There is the implication of options, of 
engagement, of active choice within the range of potentials supported by the 
existing past, which itself is multi-nodal and drawn in from more than one 
source. These two metaphors of time yield two frameworks which locate the 
past, the future and the participant in two contradictory positions. 
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Online, this issue is magnified  as there are as many metaphors as there are 
cultures logged in. Through discussing and deconstructing the assumptions 
and constraints of these metaphors, discontinuities between paradigms and 
approaches to understanding the internet may be uncovered, and new 
possibilities or new ways to approach choice and change might reveal 
previously unconsidered futures potentials. 
 
LIVED TIME 
A number of metaphors have long been dominant to understandings of 
how the internet and time relate, and they continue to overshadow others 
for a number of reasons. Most of these metaphors are conditioned by the 
imaginings and experiences of internet users. One of the key problems facing 
understandings of time in research, therefore, stems from the central view 
that any effect the internet may have is experienced only by those who use 
the medium. Such a view is reinforced, and indeed implicitly endorsed, 
when non-users are omitted altogether in studies of the social implications 
of the internet. However, as Wyatt (2003) argues, non-users do matter and 
developments in the relationship between the internet and society cannot 
help but impinge not only on those who use the internet but must also bear 
consequences for the wider society who both constitute and share in the 
experience of everyday life. 
One task confronting us, then, is the formation of a wider framework able 
to accommodate broader, more inclusive contexts. This section does so by 
drawing on the work of two theorists, Lefebvre and Durkheim, who each 
offer an understanding of time incorporating the social and the everyday. To 
begin, we briefly explore the possibilities of extending the notion of 
‘the lived’ developed by Lefebvre (1991) in thinking about space, to time. 
Although Lefebvre’s work was formulated primarily through an exploration 
of spatial issues, the notion of the lived would profit from being applied to 
thinking about time. This notion allows us to conduct wider, more inclusive 
studies of the social implications of a technology. This is because lived time 
(and space) is both a product and a pre-condition of social practices, and there 
can be few more effective ways to study the social implications of a 
technology than through the social practices that ensue from it. 
The lived is described by Lefebvre  as the social construct that dwells 
halfway between the abstract and concrete constructs (1991). For him, 
it is socially formed and the ‘materialization of social being’ (1991: 102). In 
The Production of Space, he lays out a spatial triad consisting of abstract, 
concrete and lived space (1991: 33, 38–39). Within this triad, abstract space 
is the representation of space and hence, the mentally conceived space of 
knowledge, logic, signs and codes. The ‘instrumental space’ (Elden, 2001: 






nature. Concrete space, in contrast, is the physical perception of space, usually 
encapsulated in spatial practice. As practice, concrete space implies both 
habit and cohesion in understandings of how space is used or put to work. 
Concrete space is thus the space of production.2  The interpenetration of 
abstract space and concrete space, according to Lefebvre, is what constitutes 
lived space. Lived space is the space of its inhabitants, it ‘overlays physical 
space, making symbolic use of its objects’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 39). It is socially 
constructed and hence, the space of representation.3 
However, Lefebvre cautions against the simple equation of lived space with 
space that has been socialised (1991: 190),4 as such an equation of the form 
of space with its function is a simplistic, reductionist understanding of how 
space works (pp. 33–34). It is important to realise that the intent behind the 
triads of abstract – lived – concrete or conceived – lived – perceived is not to 
cut space up into its component parts. For implicit within the interpretation 
of space (and time) as a triad is the assumption that whatever space comes to 
mean at any one point is a product of a transformative process. The nature of 
this process is intrinsically dynamic and is thus always open to the vagaries, 
complexities and contradictions of social life and its associated tensions. 
Hence, Lefebvre’s triad is an articulation of the different ways in which both 
time and space can be grasped  as lived, with all the potential of assembly (and 
accumulation) at or around a single point (p. 101). The joining of the notion 
of the lived to that of time and space emphasises the role of social praxis, 
for they embody a dialectics of possibilities that can be realised in an infinite 
number of ways through social acts and practices. 
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1976[1912]), Durkheim 
asserts that it is the ‘rhythm of social life … which is at the basis of the 
category of time’ (p. 440). According to him, at the core of intellectual 
life is a ‘framework of intelligence’ (p. 9) made up of essential, universal 
ideas including those of time and space. This is an abstract, impersonal 
framework and the universal ideas it consists of belong to and act as 
guidelines for everyone. Within such an understanding, time is not 
individually but generally defined, ‘objectively thought of by everybody in 
a single civilization’ (p. 11). In other words, the elements of the framework 
themselves sit above (or beyond) the various methods of differentiating time 
(clock, calendar). Durkheim argues that since all the people within a single 
civilisation harbour the same notions of these core ideas it stands to reason 
that the sources of these ideas are collective and have a social origin (p. 11). 
According to Durkheim, all logical thought or collective concepts, 
including the social concepts of time and space (1976[1912]: 441–2), exist 
as they do because they are born of the unique intelligence of humankind, 
of ‘collective consciousness’ (p. 444). Instead of intuition, he attributes the 
concepts of time and space to this external intelligence, which though it 
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‘bears the mark of no particular mind’ is ‘where all others meet each other’ 
(p. 434). Through his insistence that the basis of social time is collective, and 
hence social (p. 9), Durkheim can be seen to invert our understanding of 
time from both a Kantian and a Bergsonian point of view. Indeed, for him, 
the Kantian notions of transcendental time and space and the Bergsonian 
ideas of duration and flow cannot but also be sets of interpretations 
(representations) that society puts collectively to time and space (pp. 16–17). 
Understood after the manner of Durkheim, the notion of social time 
privileges the social over the individual. However, as even Lefebvre had to 
reiterate in his later work, ‘social time is itself a social product’ (2004: 73–74). 
Concerning time at least, Durkheim and Lefebvre concur: our experiences 
of time spring from our experiences of the social. If our task is to explicate 
on the social implications the internet might have on our everyday life, we 




Nevertheless, to examine a given collective experience of internet time, one 
first needs to trace just who and/or what comprises the collective, and therefore 
whose time is being examined. Accordingly, a tracing of the effects of time, 
and internet time in particular, should arguably start with a tracing of both the 
actors comprising the collectives and the assemblages producing the time. 
However, the task of tracing is often complicated by a tendency to rely on 
a separation between social and technical strata, or to view the technical as 
somehow secondary to and detrimental to the social proper. This tendency is 
made explicit in the work of Manuel Castells, for whom ‘timeless time’ and 
the ‘space of flows’ are the characteristics of the ‘network society’ (Castells, 
2000: 13). In this understanding the logic of information networks constitutes 
an entirely new paradigm (Castells, 2004) enframing (in the Heideggerian sense) 
the social. ‘Lived time’ is ‘annihilated’  into an instrumental ‘timeless time’ and 
space is de-linked from its geographic locatedness into a ‘space of flows.’ 
Castells’ approach is symptomatic of what could be described  as the 
bifurcation of network temporality. Here time is approached either as a 
loss propelled by the instrumental logic of network technology, or as an 
obliteration of ‘embodied subjectivities’ and their local social relations. This 
position stems from a particular understanding of technology and its effects on 
time and space. Accordingly, time as a product of a technique always remains 
secondary to a more primary ontological or social reality. Simultaneously, 
when technical time is seen as a deadening of ‘lived’ time, technical objects 
assembled around it are excluded. 
At the basis of this bifurcation is the belief that in the modern world there 






and lived temporality, the idea of which, when stretched, vaguely resembles 
the ancient Greek concept of Kairos. The other in turn is an anachronistic 
projection which sees the emergence, sometime in the middle centuries, 
of a radically inhuman and instrumental form of temporality, which, since 
then, has gradually established  itself as the primary temporality of the modern 
world. This is the temporality of the clock, which reads like an extreme 
remake of the position occupied in ancient Greece by Chronos. 
The key issue in this bifurcation is the confusion between time and the 
measurement of time (Serres & Latour, 1995: 60). Clock time is seen here 
as an artificial addendum to a primary social and/or natural temporality. 
Accordingly, clocks are believed to create a specific clock time of pure 
instrumentality, obfuscating temporality as emergence and substituting it 
with a temporality of orderings (Hassan, 2003, 2005). As Adrian Mackenzie 
demonstrates, the proponents of this position ‘reduce temporal complexities 
… to intervals and orderings that are inimical to human lifeworld structures’ 
(Mackenzie, 2005: 2). 
However, one cannot start answering questions about networks, without 
accounting for technical mediations  as intermediaries  constituting ‘a regime 
of timings and spacings from which society and nature, time and space 
unfold’ (Mackenzie, 2002: 95). In such a regime, temporality is always a 
measurement against a surface (Elias, 1992). For example, in Euler’s famous 
solution to the Konigsberg bridge problem, time is flattened into space and all 
possible nodal links, existing at different points of time, are visible at once, as 
different surfaces. Euler’s model places networks in a space of duration; when 
flattened into space, the entirety of a time can be visible in the present. Such 
a construct does not, however, form an ontological totality somehow separate 
from ‘lived’ embodied time/space. The effect of seeing everything from all 
sides appears ‘because we’re inside a room in which the illusion is mastered, 
and not outside’ (Latour & Hermant, 2006). 
In place of temporal homogeneity, the spatial expansion of connectivities 
confronts us with an ever-expanding multiplicity of temporal events. The 
challenge in approaching this temporality is in the heterogeneity of the actors 
appearing in the assemblage.5   As Bruno Latour argues in an influential essay 
on formalism and time (1997), the difference between temporalities does not 
lie in an illusionary bifurcation between clock time and lived time, but in the 
intensities of actors’ timings. These intensities are a function of the relation 
between the two simultaneous vectors of transportation and transformation. 
Latour illustrates this relation with the example of two travellers, one 
sitting comfortably in a bullet train, the other hacking her way through a 
jungle. Both travellers move, yet they exist in radically different spaces and 
times. According to Latour, that is because while the first is transported 
without any visible transformation, that being in turn delegated and handled 
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by a large support network of rail institutions, electrical power stations, 
technicians and machinery, the second traveller undergoes transformations 
with every step. While she has to undergo a series of transforming trials 
enforced by the jungle, the former traveller can revel in the effects of a 
seamless flow of speed. 
What differentiates the flow of this traveller’s movement from the discrete 
spacings of the jungle-explorer is not some fundamental difference between 
the techniques employed by the former and the living body of the latter, but 
the intensity, the ratio of transformation-to-transportation  resulting from their 
movements. Timings and spacings appear out of these intensities, and not the 
other way around. 
The effect of speed is accordingly the result of how much transformation 
an object undergoes during the trial of transportation. If the network 
transporting it is stable enough and allows someone or something else 
to transform instead, then the effect of seamless transportation without 
transformation occurs. The speed and seamlessness of internet flow is precisely 
such an effect. The idea of a speed inherent in technology, in some supposed 
instrumental logic, is therefore just an unfortunate illusion borne out of a 
bifurcated view of time and often ignorance of the way technical networks 
operate.6 
Instead of one homogenous global network time, this understanding reveals 
an assembly of timings, exemplified in this very article, edited through an 
online collaboration. The timing of this document, for now residing on an 
anonymous-to-us internet server, is an assembly of complexities. The fact 
that we see it as a more or less stable and homogeneous space-time is due to 
the intensity of the relation between transformation and transportation. If the 
document is stable and does not change more than we ask it to, it is because 
something else undergoes the necessary transformations thus allowing us to 
experience the effect of homogeneity. 
In other words, instead of an isochronous network flow, a ‘timeless time,’ 
we should approach network temporality as a multiplicity of times derived 
from relations between different elements (Latour, 1997). The bifurcated 
projection would never even suspect the existence of this relation, for it sees 
only the dead instrumentality of clock time and the rich, lived time of the 
social. But, returning back to our as yet ephemeral online text, which part 
of it is instrumental and which social? How can we account for the lived 
time of four collaborating humans and the equally lived time of many more 
collaborating machines if we render our searching eyes oblivious to the 
complexity of the networks involved in supporting this collaboration? ‘It is 







What makes this understanding even more compelling is the fact that on 
the internet the object, its components, and any commentary on that object 
‘exist contemporaneously and conceptually in the same place/non-place of 
the network’ (Lunenfeld, 2005: 95). Taking into account this reality, and 
the ‘spill-over’ of the internet onto the everyday, requires us to dig into the 
temporality of internet data ‘as if all the past were still present’ (Latour, 1989). 
That is because the entire assemblage of constantly re-deployed technical 
mediations holds together not one isochrony but a multitude of timings. 
If there appears the effect of a totality, ‘it is obtained through a process of 
summing up, itself localized and perpetually restarted, whose course can be 
tracked’ (Latour & Hermant, 2006: 51). In other words, the effect of a local 
homogeneity of time is a constantly upheld event, behind which works a 
multitude of actors. Temporality, technical network or not, is perpetually 
enmeshed with a topology. A good example of multiple temporalities can 
be found in the proliferation of timings within information networks. These 
involve ‘seek time, run time, read time, access time, available time, real time, 
polynomial time, time division, time slicing, time sharing, time complexity, 
write time, processor time, hold time, execution time, compilation time, 
and cycle time’ (Mackenzie, 2005: 2). The list could go on into the ever 
increasing complexity of database timings, wireless frequencies, signal-to- 
noise ratios, the timings of routing tables and so on and so forth. These 
timings, black-boxed within the network whose intermediaries they are, 
are invisible to us, unless of course they metamorphose from intermediaries 
to mediators. Their effect is a stable convention of timings, a series of 
‘temporal displacements’ (Grosz, 2001: 88–89) and enfoldings through whose 
‘interstices’ (Mackenzie, 2005: 3) percolates what we can only perceive as the 
flow of time. 
Therefore, the challenge internet time poses is that of measuring an always- 
constructed and composite collective intensity, that is, investigating who 
and what comprises the collective. This investigation is not dissimilar to an 
archaeology of temporal coexistences (Shanks, 1998). Most importantly, 
such an approach involves taking risks with time, because it brings forth 
objects as mediators. To view network temporality as the time of Kairos, of 
the event, is to involve intermediaries, techniques and unknown chains of 
stakeholders in a motion allowing its author to withdraw and testifying in her 
place (Stengers, 2000). Contrary to obliterating time, this motion creates a 
multiplicity of times. 
The question concerning network temporality is therefore in many ways a 
function of the constantly reappearing search for a time-space existing in 
opposition to the instrumental. The internet, in its perceived isotopy and 
isochrony is just the latest assemblage to be suspected of ‘pure’ instrumentality 
somehow denying ‘lived’ experience. However, there is no point in looking 
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to isolate a non-instrumental aspect of time. The issue is rather that of 
addressing the ‘modalities of instrumentality’ (Stiegler, 1998: 206) as such. 
In other words, the time of information networks is assembled, upheld and 
unfolded with particular local intensities, and it is these intensities that need 
to be explored, not the illusionary dialectic of instrumental and ‘lived.’ For 
to construct such a dialectic one has to obliterate an entire multitude of 
intermediaries upholding both the ephemeral instrumental and the event that 
wants to be thought as ‘lived.’ 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to problematise ways of approaching and understanding 
the challenge of thinking about internet time. The presented approaches form 
a deliberately heterogeneous argument aimed at exploring paths for future 
research of network temporalities. 
As the background discussion indicated, time as a philosophical concept 
has an extensive history. Different philosophical approaches redefined time 
as a series of events generating in turn a culture of habits, memories, passing 
time and laboratory practice. Today, the concept of time is able to represent 
the repetition of difference through an enactment of the present in a future 
virtual context of representation. This difference creates spaces in which 
multiple (parallel) perspectives of time can develop. This is exemplified by 
the differing metaphors of time that can be identified within transnational, 
multicultural and multilingual  spaces such as the internet. Different ways of 
talking about, understanding and framing notions of time – the imaginaries 
of time – can have ramifications for how researchers approach and discuss 
this inchoate area of study. In order to account for the growing social and 
cultural diversity of internet users and participants, discussions of time need to 
acknowledge a diversity of understandings of time. 
This diversity must also be acknowledged when considering that the 
lived experience of time is also a thoroughly social one. How we relate time 
to internet filters through into how we negotiate the daily confrontations 
between self, society and the technologies they encounter. The possibilities 
of applying the notion of the lived, as the ‘materialization of social being’ 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 102), to how we might approach the question of internet 
time is one ripe for further exploration. 
Viewing objects and technical assemblages  as active participants and 
intermediaries in the production of time and space opens the possibility of 
viewing temporality as perpetually  enmeshed with a topology that has to be 
traced, studied and engaged. Moreover, by studying the logistics of assembled 







The common thread underlying all the approaches to internet time 
raised here is, as mentioned before, the notion of time as an assemblage. 
Furthermore, the authors argue that both the understandings of time 
in relation to the internet, and internet time itself, are coming out of a 
constellation of elements – technical artefacts, social relations and metaphors – 
all playing their part in assembling, understanding, appropriating and engaging 
time. Woven throughout this is the idea that time is not and cannot be a 
homogeneous totality, external and unchanging. Rather, time is viewed as 
manufactured alongside all other elements that constitute that assemblage. 
By drawing out and discussing time as an assemblage, a product of 
the intersection of various elements within a complex system such as the 
internet, this paper manifests the necessity, for internet research discourse, 
of conceptualizations capable of engaging such multiplicities either in a 
metaphorical, social or almost archaeological manner. It is anticipated that 
in drawing attention to this neglected area of internet scholarship, a more 
nuanced and detailed approach to time and the internet can be developed. 
As the title already suggests, this article aimed to reinvigorate the 
conceptual approaches to internet time, and argue for a new set of questions 
concerning that temporality. The deliberate diversity of the conceptual 
approaches outlined in the article provides a setting for cross-pollination 
between otherwise disparate theoretical positions on time, and offers a 
comparative tool-kit of temporal conceptualizations for internet researchers 




1   The subordination of Chronos is justified by the fact that he is considered responsible 
only for quantifying time, measuring periods and seasons and therefore monitoring the 
repetitive, cyclic movement of the skies, but is not accountable for what time unfolds, 
for the quality of time. 
2   This article uses Shields’ (1999: 161) translation of Lefebvre’s term (l’espace vécu) as 
‘spaces of representations.’ 
3   Lefebvre’s interchangeable usage of the terms ‘social space’ and ‘lived space’ is 
continued here, with a preference for the latter term. The same applies to Durkheim’s 
usage of social time. 
4   Silverstone (1993) makes a similar point about the socially constructed nature of time, 
using the family unit and its daily activities as the locus. 
5   For example, consider Beatriz da Costa’s Pigeonblog Project: http://www.pigeonblog. 
mapyourcity.net/ 
6   For an interesting discussion of technology and mobility see Sheller, 2004; Sheller & 
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